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Abstract 
This study focuses on the various provinces’ preferential policies towards ethnic minorities in the 
Chinese college admission system, specifically in term of bonus points awarded in the National 
College Entrance Examination. It explores how demographics of ethnic minorities in provinces 
influence provincial governments’ preferential policy-making. By examining 31 Chinese 
provinces’ population, education, economic data, and bonus point policies, this study finds that a 
higher percentage of minority population likely prompts provincial governments to make more 
generous and detailed policies. However, whether autonomous counties are significantly 
disadvantaged educationally (lower student enrollment rates in regular secondary school) and 
financially (lower GDP per capita) compared to regular counties does not seem to affect 
preferential policy making. Two noticeable outliers in the study are Sichuan province and Xizang 
(Tibet) Autonomous Region. 
 
Introduction 
Very few, if any, deny the role higher education attainment plays in upward social 
mobility. Many also believe that minorities, racial, ethnic etc., are disadvantaged in the process. 
Modern states with multiracial and multiethnic societies have widely adopted positive policies to 
redress historic inequalities among ethnic groups and the potential for ethnic conflict (Jalali and 
Lipset 1992). The People’s Republic of China, with Han and 55 other government classified 
ethnic minority groups, is no exception.  
Chinese college admission is based entirely on the National College Entrance 
Examination (NCEE, gaokao 高考). Though different provinces administer different exams, 
most of the exams have 750 points in total. In addition to the raw score received from the test, 
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some students may also receive bonus points because they are student athletes, nationwide 
academic competition winners, honors students (sanhao xuesheng 三好学生), children of 
overseas Chinese (huaqiao 华侨) or returned overseas Chinese (guiqiao 归侨), Taiwanese 
students, ethnic minorities etc. 
The national policy that universities are supposed to “relax” their admission standards to 
an appropriate extent for ethnic minority students has legal bases (Postiglione 1999). 
Participation of ethnic minorities in higher education has been promoted in three ways (Min 
1997). First, ethnic minorities are given enrollment priority – the admission standards in terms of 
scores on the NCEE have been adjusted by the government. Bonus points awarded to minority 
applicants, however, have been steadily decreasing. The government has been encouraging 
minority student to engage in “self-strengthening” (ziqiang 自强), with the hope that bonus 
points based on minority status will not be needed eventually. Second, starting in 1980, some 
national universities have established special preparatory classes for minority groups due to a 
Ministry of Education of China’s requirement. Ethnic minority students enrolled in the university 
with scores lower than the minimum are required to go through one or two years of preparatory 
studies before being integrated into the regular student body. Third, nationality institutes that 
mostly admit ethnic minority students have been established. Even with all these efforts, 
minorities are still not well-represented in higher education, especially in top-tier universities. In 
this paper, I focus on the first method mentioned above. Thus, “preferential policies” in the 
following texts only refers to the practice of bonus points if not specified. With the general trend 
of decentralization in educational governance (Mok 2002), provincial governments in China 
have deployed various preferential policies towards ethnic minorities – offering different amount 
of points based on different criteria. 
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Although they only constitute 8.49% of the population, ethnic minorities not only 
demonstrate their specialness in the college admission system, but also through China’s 
administrative subdivision. An autonomous region (AR, zizhiqu 自治区) is a minority entity that 
has a higher population of particular minority ethnic groups. Same as a province, AR is a first-
level administrative subdivision with its own government (see Appendix Map.1 for a map of 
China including provinces and ARs). This type of entity exists for smaller administrative units as 
well. After AR (from the biggest to the smallest), there are autonomous prefecture, autonomous 
county, and autonomous township. 
Scholars, policy makers, and average citizens have discussed consistently the equality of 
educational opportunity as a social issue. However, in China’s case with the specific regard to 
ethnic minorities, the equality of educational opportunity is rarely discussed in a rigorous way 
supported by data. Focusing on higher education, I want to explore why preferential policies 
towards ethnic minorities differ across provinces in Chinese college admissions. Specifically, 
why do provinces have different bonus points for ethnic minorities in the NCEE? Some may 
think that one point in NCEE does not matter that much. However, since college admission is 
solely based on points, one point might put a student right on the cutoff to be admitted to the 
ideal school. At the same time, because many applicants taking the exam each year, a one point 
increase sometimes can put an applicant in front of another 600 people in the overall ranking in a 
province. Since most of the provinces offer at least five bonus points to ethnic minority students, 
they have a huge advantage in the admission process, which indicates the importance of 
deepening our understanding of provinces’ preferential policies. In the following section, the 
literature review starts with the foundation of the concept of equality of educational opportunity 
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that originated in the U.S., and then presents the big picture of education and ethnic minorities in 
China, and specifically discusses higher education and preferential policies at last. 
 
Educational Inequality and Ethnic Minorities in China 
Equality of Educational Opportunity  
Throughout the history of U.S. education, scholars have provided various 
conceptualizations of equality of educational opportunity, but failed to agree on a universally 
applicable definition. Nevertheless, two schools of thought, originated with Thomas Jefferson 
and Horace Mann, mostly dominate researchers’ ideas of what constitutes an equal educational 
opportunity. The cleavage between the two camps is this: do scholars define equality based on 
input or output of education? The trend from Jefferson places emphasis on input, whereas the 
trend from Mann is concerned with equal output. Jefferson emphasized the equality of all men 
and their right to be educated (Ulich 1965). Mann stressed that equal attainment, or outcome, is 
possible. Scholars do not necessarily separate the two from each other, and many of them 
incorporate both concepts into their studies. 
The Coleman Study (1966), the product of an extensive survey requested by the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, identifies the following four types of inequalities: (1) differences of 
community’s input to the school; (2) different racial composition of the school; (3) various 
intangible characteristics of the school as well as the factors directly traceable to the community 
inputs to the schools; (4) consequences of the school for individuals with equal backgrounds and 
abilities. The first and the third definitions are directly related to Jefferson’s idea of input. The 
last definition focuses on Mann’s ideal of equality of result but at the same time works on the 
premise of same individual input.  
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Wise (1972) proposes nine definitions of equal educational opportunity, each of which is 
concerned with either inputs or outputs of students. One might be surprised that different 
researchers’ categorizations of these definitions are different. They agree that the negative 
definition, the foundation definition, the competition definition, the equal-dollars-per-pupil 
definition, and the maximum-variance-ratio-definition are definitely dealing with educational 
inputs. In addition, the minimum attainment definition counts towards the output category. 
Takase (1999) claims that the definition of leveling – resources should be allocated in inverse 
proportion to students’ ability based on the assumption that students should as nearly as possible 
leave school with an equal chance of success, talks about outputs. However, in his overview, 
Nwaguogu (1984) identifies two other definitions concerning outputs: the full-opportunity 
definition – all persons are to be given full opportunity to develop their abilities to their limit, 
and the classification definition – equality for all within a classification based on the general idea 
of “the equal treatment of equals”. One take away from this comparison is that the two schools of 
thought can sometimes be intertwined when talking about more specific policies. 
Levin (1976) and Garms et al. (1978) assess equality of educational opportunity 
according to the following four standards: (1) equality of educational access; (2) equality of 
educational participation; (3) equality of educational results; and (4) equality of educational 
effects on life changes. Clearly, the four criteria fit into the two main camps – the former two 
focusing on inputs, and the latter two on outputs. Nwabuogu (1984) presents these four standards 
in a step-wise diagram showing the evolution of measures of equal educational opportunity over 
time, which is in accord with the sequence presented above. The first criterion is the most 
traditional, more easily-achievable measure of equal educational opportunity, and the last 
criterion is the most advanced, least attainable measure. As society prospers politically, 
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economically, and socially, the move towards equalizing resource inputs and individual 
achievements begin to emerge.  
Similarly, Green (1980) advances the two views, calling them “the best principle” and the 
“equal principle”. The former shares Jefferson’s ideal, claiming the right to receive 
individualized education that is the best for each child, whereas the latter aligns with Mann’s 
ideal of the right to receive an equal education for everyone. The two principles are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive, according to Kurosaki (1995), which is consistent with our 
observation about the Wise definitions and the time process Nwaguogu (1984) presents.  
From the scholarly works mentioned above, one can see that the two trends clearly focus 
on different criteria of equal educational opportunity. However, researchers have been 
incorporating both ideas into their conceptualizations. Thus, when examining specific policies, 
scholars should not overlook either side. An approach that balances the two competing values 
may render better results. Although the literature discussed above does not have a specific focus 
on higher education, nor is it related to China, and Chinese scholarly works discussed in the 
following section do not refer back to the U.S. originated concepts, scholars still have to keep the 
two schools of thought in mind when studying the preferential policies in education in China, 
especially when making policy recommendations. In fact, China’s policies to encourage ethnic 
minorities to receive all levels of education seem to be a combination of input and output focuses. 
The government wants to ensure minorities’ right to receive education, and hope that ethnic 
minorities can achieve equal attainment as Han students at the same time. 
Education and Ethnic Minorities in China 
The General Picture 
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Access to schooling has never been more widespread in China. When compared to other 
developing countries, China’s pace in making education available to its huge population has been 
astonishingly fast. The irony is that while the socialist market economy has increased the 
educational choices available, it has also made these choices more a function of poverty, gender, 
and ethnicity compared to the pre-reform, planned economy period. Educational inequalities 
continue to widen (Postiglione 2006). Although economic development and policies aiming to 
promote minority education have increased access to formal schooling since 1949, the 
educational attainment of ethnic minorities still remains behind the Han majority. 
 Minority groups in China are diverse with regard to cultural practices and historical 
experience with the larger Han society (Mackerras 1994, 1995; Gladney 1996; Harrell 1995). 
Studies have suggested that ethnic groups develop unfavorable attitudes toward education if they 
perceive that the school system is incompatible with aspects of their own cultures, or if they do 
not observe tangible returns to education among members of their own communities (Hansen 
1999; Harrell and Mgebbu 1999). According to Hansen (2013), one big problem of minority 
school education is that it is entirely based upon Chinese language and history, allowing no room 
for the transmission for cultural values of ethnic minorities and denying the significance of the 
minorities’ own languages, histories, religions, and cultural values. There is a striking 
contradiction where the government preaches the constitutional equality of nationalities (minzu 
民族), while impressing on minority students immense feelings of cultural inferiority. The 
Chinese government educators and many Chinese intellectuals praise education as a means of 
civilizing the “backward”, which contradicts the outspoken message of national equality. This is 
one of the reasons the Chinese government fails to popularize Chinese education effectively to 
some minority groups. On the contrary, in other regions where establishment of Confucian 
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education was early and the history of Han influence was long (for example, Naxi in Lijiang, 
Yunnan), the popularization effort is very successful. Nevertheless, being Sinicized by education, 
minority students’ level of understanding of their own ethnic culture is worrisome (Sun 2012). 
Consistent with the theory presented before, another important reason some minorities choose 
not to receive education is that they fail to see significant economic or social advantage in 
spending money on school education. It certainly does not help that most of the estimated return 
to education in China is considerably lower than the world average (Han 2014). 
Higher Education and Preferential Policies 
Most Chinese scholars recognize the necessity and benefits of preferential policies 
towards ethnic minorities (Jin and Wang 2007; Long 2010; Sun 2012; Tang 2003; Teng and Ma 
2009; Wang 2007; Wang 2009). They argue that the policies function as an effective guarantee 
of more equal access to education right, opportunities, and resources for ethnic minority students 
whose educational performance is comparatively poor. At the same time, scholars recognize that 
the unequal opportunity for ethnic minorities is due to economic reasons and the lack of 
educational resources in some regions. Thus preferential admission is a reasonable remedial 
policy to address the inequality. Hannum (2002) also confirmed the role of poverty and 
geography in contributing to educational disparities by ethnicity. Wang (2009) states clearly the 
policy’s positive impacts, which include increasing cultural and linguistic diversity at 
universities at a minimal financial cost; significantly broadening minorities’ access to college 
education with little social cost; having great symbolic significance for ethnic equality, and the 
cohesion of the Chinese nation. 
However, some scholars criticize this policy. Wang (2010) lists a series of problems the 
current preferential policies cause: (1) minority students have less learning enthusiasm and 
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confidence; (2) policies create waste in education and human capital; (3) companies and 
organizations have bias against minority graduates; (4) admission process is less fair due to 
opportunistic tendency. For example, there were numerous scandals that applicants falsely 
reported or deliberately changed their ethnic identities in order to obtain the bonus points (Wang 
2009; Sun 2012). Ma (2009) adds that the adjustment of admission standards is the primary 
factor responsible for the decline of educational quality in both secondary schools and 
universities. 
Other researchers are concerned with the concept of fairness or equality. Yan and Li 
(2012) explain the problem in terms of “reverse discrimination”. They point out that under the 
current “separate-provincial admission” (fenshenluqu 分省录取) model, the preferential policies 
might hurt Han students’ opportunity to get into college. The current circumstance is that within 
one province, the access to education resources is fairly equal for different ethnic groups, while 
most inequalities occur among different provinces. Under the separate-provincial admission 
model, the real competition for admissions is within province. Han students in provinces with big 
minority populations, without preferential admissions, are disadvantaged compared to their 
minority classmates because those provinces generally do not provide good educational 
resources due to economic constraints. 
Also, in regard to equality, Zhou (2009) states that China’s approach to national equality 
borrowed from the Soviet Union causes two major problems. The approach emphasizes equality 
of groups while it ignores differences between groups. For example, different groups’ 
proportional representation in universities is not considered. Other studies also mention that 
some ethnic groups like Mongol, Manchu, and Hui have exceeded the average level of 
educational attainment of the country (Sun 2012). Second, the approach focuses on equality 
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among groups while it ignores inequality within a group. For instance, larger quotas go to urban 
minority residents than rural minority residents. In short, the Chinese concept of “minority 
education” tends to regard all nationalities as one relatively homogenous group of people in need 
of more or less uniform special considerations within education (Hansen 2013). 
Despite the controversy, studies offer very similar policy recommendations. Many 
researchers recognize that economic reasons and the lack of educational resources cause unequal 
educational opportunities for ethnic minorities (Long 2010; Tang 2003; Wang 2007; Xiao and 
Liu 2014). They recommend that the government lower the tuition and provide special financial 
aid to help minority college students (Jin and Wang 2007; Long 2010; Tang 2003). In the long 
run, the government should level the access to basic education, making minority applicants more 
competitive in “gaokao”, which will lead to more equal access to higher education (Wang 2010; 
Yan and Li 2012). These considerations show that China’s ideal of equality of educational 
opportunity is in accordance with Jefferson’s concept of input, which according to Nwabuogu 
(1984), is the most traditional, more easily-achievable measure of equal educational opportunity.  
Other studies suggest that the government should improve the preferential policies by taking into 
consideration the differences in region, socio-economic status, access to basic education etc. 
(Teng and Ma 2009; Sun 2012). 
From the articles discussed above, one can notice that most scholars examine the 
preferential policies on the national level, ignoring the fact that preferential policies vary widely 
among provinces. My research focuses on comparing different provinces and explaining why 
they have different preferential policies in terms of bonus points for ethnic minorities in the 
NCEE. I contend that the distinct demographics of ethnic minorities in each province’s 
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jurisdiction influence provincial governments’ preferential policy making. In the next section, I 
will explain my theory and hypotheses in a more detailed fashion. 
 
Theory and Hypotheses 
Why do preferential policies towards ethnic minorities differ across provinces in Chinese 
college admissions? Under the provincial enrollment model, the real competition in admissions 
is within each province (Yan and Li 2012). One might think that this makes comparisons 
between provinces meaningless because they do not compete with each other. However, this is 
exactly the reason why it is important to explain the difference in policies. Although all 
provincial governments build on the central government’s foundational policy, each government 
acts solely on specific preferential policy making. I theorize that the distinct demographics of 
ethnic minorities in each province’s jurisdiction affect the preferential policies made by 
provincial governments. Specifically, I propose the following four hypotheses: 
1) Greater percentage of bonus points out of the total points are given to 
ethnic minority students when a province has a bigger percentage of 
minority population; 
2)  Greater percentage of bonus points out of the total points are given to 
ethnic minority students when, within that province, the student 
enrollment rates in regular secondary schools of autonomous counties are 
significantly lower than other regular counties; 
3) Greater percentage of bonus points out of the total points are given to 
ethnic minority students when, within that province, the GDP per capita of 
autonomous counties are significantly lower than other regular counties; 
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4) A province has more types of bonus points for ethnic minority students 
when a province has bigger percentage of minority population. 
The first three hypotheses share the same dependent variable: the percentage of bonus 
points out of the total points given to ethnic minority student. Hypothesis 1 is based on the 
assumption that when a group constitutes a bigger percentage of the population, the government 
needs to consider minority interest more in policy making to prevent turbulence. Keeping the 
stability of the society (weiwen, 维稳) is one of the Chinese government’s top priorities. This is 
also true for provincial governments, especially for provinces that have higher percentages of 
ethnic minority populations. For example, in Xizang (Tibet) and Xinjiang Autonomous Regions, 
there has been a series of violent disturbances due to the tension between Tibetans/Uyghurs and 
the government. In those provinces, the government’s preeminent goal is to pacify the unrest. 
Offering more bonus points in the NCEE and letting more minority students receive mainstream 
higher education is one response to lessen intergroup conflict. Although Tibet and Xinjiang may 
be the most extreme examples, there is no doubt that the bonus points serve as a “carrot” to bring 
more minorities to the government’s side. Plus, many students go back to their hometown to 
serve as government officials, which is even more effective for the overall objective of a stable 
society. 
Hypotheses 2 and 3 look into the difference between autonomous counties and regular 
counties in provinces. Note that autonomous counties, although not exclusively populated by 
ethnic minority citizens, have much higher percentages of ethnic minority citizens than regular 
counties. Both hypotheses are establishing the fact that ethnic minorities are disadvantaged 
compared to Han. Specifically, hypothesis 2 focuses on whether minorities are disadvantaged in 
education by comparing the student enrollment rates in autonomous counties and regular 
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counties. Hypothesis 3 concentrates on whether minorities are disadvantaged economically in 
general by comparing the GDP per capita in both types of counties. Note that educational 
disadvantage and economic disadvantage assessed in these two hypotheses are probably inter-
related since education and economic well-being are always intertwined, both promoting the 
other. I hypothesize that when ethnic minorities are more disadvantaged educationally and 
economically, provincial governments will make strong preferential policy and will award more 
bonus points. This aligns with the central government’s considerations to have these remedial 
policies in the first place, where ethnic minorities need special treatment due to their 
disadvantaged background. 
Hypothesis 4 has a different dependent variable from the other hypotheses but shares the 
independent variables with hypothesis 1. I assume that when a province has a bigger percentage 
of ethnic minorities, the ethnic population in that population is likely to be more diverse. The 
diversity here can entail a wide range of criteria: how many different ethnic minority groups 
reside within the province? Is the habitation pattern of ethnic minorities scattered or concentrated? 
How many ethnic minorities live in urban areas and in rural areas? What is the language of 
administration during the NCEE, Mandarin or traditional ethnic languages? When the ethnic 
population is more diverse, the provincial governments inevitably need to make more detailed 
policies to address this diversity. Thus there will be more types or levels of bonus points awarded 
to ethnic minorities in those provinces. This can refer to different numbers of bonus points for 
students living in areas where minorities are highly concentrated (such as autonomous 
townships), versus living sporadically in other rural or even urban areas. For Jilin and 
Heilongjiang province, this refers to different numbers of bonus points that are given to students 
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who use Mandarin or traditional ethnic language during NCEE. There is a variety of criteria for 
provinces in terms of offering different types or levels of bonus points. 
One might raise a question about the directionality of the relationship: could the more 
generous preferential policies attract more ethnic minorities to move to that province? This is 
highly unlikely due to the household registration system (hukou zhidu 户口制度) in China. As a 
result of hukou being registered with a specific local police station, changing hukou is usually a 
difficult task involving onerous paperwork. This restricts one’s freedom to migrate across 
provinces, or even within province between rural and urban areas. Many are deterred by the 
complicated process. In addition, a student’s eligibility to take NCEE in a province is related to 
hukou. If hukou record shows that the student recently migrated to the place where he or she 
plans to take NCEE, the student risks the possibility of not being granted the permission to take 
the exam. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that it is the ethnic minority population that influences 
the provincial preferential policy making. 
The four hypotheses all address the specific demographic features of the ethnic minorities 
within a province, which leads to my overarching thesis statement that distinct demographics of 
ethnic minorities in each province’s jurisdiction affect a provincial government’s preferential 
policy making. 
 
Research Design 
Definition and Measurement 
 In this study, provinces I am referring to are the 31 provinces (or autonomous regions) in 
mainland China, thus excluding Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan due to their distinct college 
admission systems. The dependent variable for the first three hypotheses is what percentage of 
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bonus points out of total points is given to ethnic minority students in each province. Although 
the NCEE’s total number of points is 750 for most provinces, several provinces use different 
total points. As a result, the dependent variable is defined in percentage scale. When examining 
these three hypotheses, I take into account only the highest possible bonus points an ethnic 
minority student can get in a province. In other words, different levels of bonus points within a 
province’s policy are omitted. This simplifies the process while not hindering the relevance and 
accuracy of the study. At the same time, it makes sense to examine the upper limit of bonus 
points given because it shows exactly how far the provincial governments can be pushed in 
policy making considering the demographics of ethnic minorities in their jurisdictions. The 
percentages are calculated according the list of provinces’ preferential policies in 2014 compiled 
by the widely-known college application expert in China who goes by the pseudonym Chenwu.  
The dependent variable for the fourth hypothesis is how many different types or levels of 
bonus points a province’s preferential policy has. “Type” refers to any specification in the 
preferential policy that addresses part of the ethnic minority applicants. For example, this can be 
multiple clauses that address the bonus points offered to different ethnic minority groups, or 
clauses that separate the policy towards students who take the NCEE in Mandarin from student 
who take it in their traditional ethnic language etc. “Level” refers to the different amount of 
bonus points given. However, if a province offers two types of bonus points in the preferential 
policy but they are the same level, both are ten points for example, the province would still be 
assigned the value of two in this scale. In addition, if a section of the policy states that "when a 
Han student and an ethnic minority student have the same score, the latter is preferred in 
admission" without designating points-added, I count this as 0.5 in this scale. Note that this scale 
does not include the specific policies towards Han living in minority concentrated areas. 
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 The independent variable for hypotheses 1 and 4 is percentage of minority population of 
a province. These data will come directly from the 2000 Census Data of National Bureau of 
Statistics of China. For hypotheses 2 and 3, the independent variable is the calculated difference 
in percentage (∆%), examining how much lower the enrollment rates in regular secondary 
schools and the GDP per capita in autonomous counties are than in regular counties. I chose to 
calculate percentages instead of using numerical differences because the former more accurately 
demonstrates the extent of the disparity. For instance, two provinces may have the same 
numerical difference of 1,000 dollars in GDP per capita between two county types, but the 
baseline GDP per capita, GDP per capita of regular counties, may be 10,000 dollars apart, 
making the numerical difference measurement imprecise in judging the disparities.  
I will demonstrate the calculation involved in hypotheses 2 and 3 using Liaoning 
province as an example. Liaoning has 36 regular counties and eight autonomous counties. For 
hypothesis 2, I calculate the weighted averages of student enrollment rates in regular secondary 
schools in these two county types. The weighted average for regular counties is 3.07 students per 
10,000 people, while the weighted average for autonomous counties is 2.21 students per 10,000 
people. I subtract the latter from the former, and the result indicates that for every 10,000 people, 
the autonomous counties have 0.86 fewer students enrolled in regular secondary schools than 
regular counties. This numerical difference is then divided by the weighted average of regular 
counties (3.07 per 10,000 people) in order to give us the difference in percentage. Thus, the 
autonomous counties’ enrollment rate of regular secondary schools in Liaoning province is 28.15% 
lower than regular counties’ rate. The 28.15% is the value of the independent variable for 
hypothesis 2. Note that a negative percentage means that autonomous counties’ enrollment rate is 
actually higher than regular counties. 
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Similarly, I calculate the GDP per capita of both regular counties and autonomous 
counties. For Liaoning province, the regular counties have a GDP per capita of 6,716.67 dollars, 
while the autonomous counties have a GDP per capita of 4,877.79 dollars. After subtraction, the 
result shows that the autonomous counties’ GDP per capita is 1,838.88 dollars lower than regular 
counties’. This amount is then divided by 6,717.67 dollars, the regular counties’ GDP per capita. 
Therefore, the GDP per capita in Liaoning’s autonomous counties is 27.38% lower than in its 
regular counties. The 27.38% is the value of the independent variable for hypothesis 3. A 
negative province percentage indicates that autonomous counties have a higher GDP per capita 
compared to regular counties in that province. 
The county level data of population, enrollment, and GDP needed to do the test are 
provided by the China Data Center at the University of Michigan. To maintain the time 
consistency of independent variables, I use the county level data in the year of 2000 as well. 
Note that for hypotheses 2 and 3, data of the autonomous regions and provinces that do not have 
autonomous counties are excluded because no comparison can be made. I expect most of the 
calculated differences in percentage are positive since ethnic minorities are generally less 
educationally and economically advantaged. This does not mean that a negative value is 
impossible to appear for several specific ethnic groups are actually do equally well or even better 
than Han in terms of family wealth and education attainment. 
For each hypothesis, I will create a graph to show the relationship between the 
independent variable and the dependent variable. If my hypotheses are reasonable, the graphs 
should all show positive correlations. 
Limitations 
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One important limitation of this study is time consistency of the data sources of different 
variables. The dependent variables, percentage of bonus points out of the total points and types 
or levels of bonus points, are generated according to policies in 2014, while all the independent 
variables are in the year of 2000 due to the difficulty of finding comprehensive 2010 Census data. 
However, the preferential policies towards ethnic minorities remain quite stable over the years, 
unlike preferential policies towards awards recipients of academic competitions or certified 
national standard athletes, due to central government’s firm stand on the importance of these 
remedial policies. Therefore, this study can still provide some insights on why provinces have 
different preferential policies towards ethnic minorities in college admissions.  
Another thing that needs to be considered is that this is a specific case study of the 
Chinese college admissions system. The results of this study are not likely to be generalizable to 
other populations or countries due to China’s uniqueness as a country, a state, and a nation. 
 
Discussion of Results and Analysis 
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Graph 1. Percentage of Bonus Points out of Total by 
Percentage of Ethnic Minority Population 
(N=31 Provinces) 
Source: Chenwu (2014), China Data Center (2000) 
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 Graph 1. illustrates the relationship between the percentage of ethnic minorities in a 
provinces’ populations and the percentage of bonus points out of the total points that are given to 
ethnic minority students. Taking most of the points on the graph into account, a positive 
correlation between the variables can be observed. If ethnic minorities constitute a higher 
percentage of a province’s population, then that province is more likely to offer more generous 
bonus points to ethnic minority students in NCEE. Although most of the data points are clustered 
in the lower left corner (x-axis 0%-40%; y-axis 0%-3%), and many points are close to the y-axis, 
the graph shows that as the percentage of ethnic minority population increases, the spread of the 
percentage of bonus points awarded shrinks and the data points are more close to the upper 
bound of this corner. There are two noticeable outliers on the graph – Sichuan province at the 
upper left corner, and Xiziang (Tibet) Autonomous Region at the lower right corner. I will 
analyze the possible reasons for them to be drastically different from the rest of the provinces. 
Overall, the graph aligns with hypothesis 1. 
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Graph 2. Percentange of Bonus Points out of Total by 
Percentage Difference in Student Enrollment Between 
Regular and Autonomous Counties 
(N=15 Provinces) 
Source: Chenwu (2014), China Data Center (2000) 
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For hypotheses 2 and 3, I mentioned in the research design section that I would exclude 
all the autonomous regions and provinces that do not have autonomous counties. In the end, only 
fifteen provinces are included in these two analyses. Because most of the bonus points are 
numbers like 5, 10, 20 and most of the provinces have 750 total points in NCEE, the levels of 
percentage of bonus points are limited for these fifteen provinces. In fact, eight out of the fifteen 
provinces, more than half, award 1.33% bonus points in the exam. There are only five different 
percentages of bonus points in total for these provinces. Thus, it is very hard to draw reliable 
conclusions from the graphs. The graphs do meet my expectation that most of the data points are 
in the positive side of the x-axis. This means that in general, average student enrollment rates in 
regular secondary schools is higher in regular counties than in autonomous counties. Similarly, 
average GDP per capita is higher in regular counties than in autonomous counties. However, 
when paying attention to the right side of the graphs, it is hard to discern any pattern. Sichuan 
province still stands out in the graphs due its incredibly generous preferential policy.  
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Graph 3. Percentage of Bonus Points out of Total by 
Percentage Difference in GDP per capita Between  
Regular and Autonomous Counties 
(N=15 Provinces) 
Source: Chenwu (2014), China Data Center (2000) 
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On the negative side of the x-axis, Qinghai province is the outlier in Graph 2. Out of the 
seven autonomous counties in Qinghai, five of them are designated Hui and Tu autonomous 
counties. Sun (2012) mentions Hui as one of the ethnic minorities that has better education 
attainment then the nation’s average. Thus, part of the reason why Qinghai has a negative value 
may be that Hui and Tu students have better access to secondary education than regular counties 
or their families are more willing to send them to schools. Since Qinghai province has a very 
high percentage of ethnic minority population (45.97%), the bar is set relatively low compared to 
a province that has more than 90% of Han population with a very high enrollment rate. The data 
proves this point because Qinghai actually has the lowest regular county enrollment rate among 
the fifteen provinces. The average regular county enrollment for all provinces included is 3.43 
for every 10,000 people, whereas Qinghai’s enrollment is 0.89 for every 10,000 people. For the 
autonomous counties, Qinghai’s enrollment (1.71 per 10,000 people) is only slightly above the 
average of all provinces (1.67 per 10,000 people). 
 In Graph 3, the negative outliers are Jilin and Hubei province. Hubei is really close to the 
borderline where the calculated difference in GPD per capital in percentage is only -2.70%, 
whereas Jilin is a much more extreme case because its difference in percentage is -21.70%. 
Neither province has a big ethnic minority population (Jilin 9.15%, Hubei 4.36%). Both 
autonomous counties in Hubei province are designated as Tujia Autonomous County, which 
means Tujua people are slightly better off economically than the general population in Hubei. 
For Jilin, the three autonomous counties are Manchu, Mongol, and Korean. The first two 
minorities are mentioned by Sun (2012) as exceeding the national average higher education 
attainment, and Koreans have the anecdotal reputation of being well-educated, too. Considering 
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the widely recognized reciprocal relationship between education and financial success, it is not 
surprising that the value for Jinlin is negative.  
 
 Graph 4 presents a strong positive relationship between percentage of province’s ethnic 
minority population and the number of types/levels of bonus points a province offers. If ethnic 
minorities constitute a higher percentage of a province’s population, that province is more likely 
to create more detailed preferential policies that awarded several different bonus points amounts, 
distinguishing students who are from different minority groups, different 
cities/townships/counties, rural/urban areas, or who use mandarin/traditional ethnic language in 
NCEE etc. Provinces employ various criteria to subdivide their ethnic minority applicants. 
Unlike graph 1, one can spot a clear trend even in the lower left corner in graph 4. Overall, the 
graph demonstrates consistency with my hypothesis 4. However, this graph has the same outliers 
as graph 1, with Sichuan province in the upper left corner, and Xizang (Tibet) Autonomous 
Region in the lower right corner. 
 It is very interesting that two graphs present the same outliers – Sichuan and Tibet. Again, 
hypothesis 1 and 4 share independent variables – percentage of province’s ethnic minority 
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Graph 4. Number of Types/Levels of Bonus Points by  
Percentage of Ethnic Minority Population 
(N=30 Provinces) 
Source: Chenwu (2014), China Data Center (2000) 
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population, while having different dependent variables – percentage of bonus points granted and 
number of types/levels of bonus points granted. Demographically, Tibet has the highest ethnic 
minority population percentage 93.93%, most of them Tibetan, leading the second place 
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region by more than 30%. It shares very little with the other 
Chinese provinces regarding culture. The Tibetan culture heavily relies on Buddhism. However, 
unlike the rest of China which is mainly influenced by Han-Chinese Buddhism; Tibet is 
dominated by the Tibetan Buddhism division. Religion is a much more important part in life for 
Tibetans than for average Chinese. Not surprisingly, the most respected people there are monks. 
As previously mentioned in the literature review section, some scholars contend that ethnic 
groups develop unfavorable attitudes toward education if they perceive that the school system is 
incompatible with aspects of their own cultures (Hansen 1999; Harrell and Mgebbu 1999).  
Hansen (2013) points out the problem precisely: even in areas where minorities are heavily 
concentrated, school education is still entirely based upon Chinese history and mainstream 
values, allowing very little if any room for distinct languages, histories, religions, and cultural 
values of ethnic minorities. Therefore, regular education is not a very appealing choice. Tibetan 
families are more likely to be willing to send their sons to monasteries than to let them go to 
regular secondary schools. In 2000, when compared to other provinces, Tibet had the lowest 
regular secondary school enrollment (5.52 per 10,000 people), the fewest secondary schools and 
higher education institutions in China (0.55 and 0.66 for 10,000 people respectively). All these 
indicate that not many Tibetan students actually take the NCEE to pursue further education, 
making little sense for the provincial government to develop generous or detailed preferential 
policies. 
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Sichuan province, the other outlier, has a relatively low ethnic minority population (5%), 
but offers ethnic minority students very high numbers of bonus points, and has a very detailed 
preferential policy. Sichuan is unique because despite its small minority population, there are 
three autonomous prefectures and four autonomous counties within the jurisdiction of the 
province. It has more ethnic administrative units than any other province that has a similar 
percentage of ethnic minority population. The three autonomous prefectures (Garzê Tibetan 
Autonomous Prefecture, Liangshan Yi Autonomous Prefecture, Ngawa Tibetan and Qiang 
Autonomous Prefecture) cover more than 60% of the land in Sichuan. Thus, the ethnic minority 
population in the autonomous administrative units is more spread out than usual. The 
geographical distribution may result in additional difficulty in providing access to education for 
ethnic minority students. This may be the reason why Sichuan provincial government decided to 
offer very generous bonus points to ethnic minority applicants.  
For hypothesis 4, Sichuan’s preferential policy is more detailed because it has separate 
clauses for ethnic minority students in different geographical areas, and for each clause, it offers 
different levels of bonus points for students who are applying to first-tier universities (yiben 
yuanxiao/benyipi yuanxiao 一本院校/本一批院校) and non-first-tier universities (Chenwu, 
2014). The wide geographic spread of the ethnic minority population can explain why Sichuan 
provincial government wants to establish clear standards on students in which areas get bonus 
points. Interestingly, Sichuan is the only province that differentiates the level of bonus points 
based on whether or not the student is applying to first-tier universities. Specifically, first-tier 
university applicants receive lower bonus points than other applicants. However, admission to 
first-tier universities is the most competitive in terms of the NCEE score required. This practice 
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could be Sichuan provincial government’s effort to offer preferential treatment to ethnic minority 
applicants but still maintain some fairness in the most competitive part of the admission. 
 
Conclusion 
 This paper explores the relationship between demographic characteristics of ethnic 
minorities in provinces and the preferential policies towards ethnic minority students in Chinese 
college admission system, in the form of bonus points awarded in the NCEE. The results suggest 
that when a province has bigger percentage of minority population, it is likely to offer greater 
percentage of bonus points out of the total points. It also tends to have a more detailed policy that 
includes more types and levels of bonus points. Nevertheless, Sichuan and Tibet are the two 
outliers in these analyses. The potential reasoning for Tibet being an outlier is that the cultural 
incompatibility makes regular education a less attractive path, which means very few Tibetan 
students take NCEE to pursue higher education. Detailed and generous preferential policies 
might be useless, so the government did not create them. The wide geographical spread of ethnic 
minority population may be the reason that Sichuan is an outlier. The generous policy may be an 
indication that the provincial government wants to compensate for the difficulty of providing 
access to education for ethnic minority students added by their geographical spread. The 
provincial government’s effort to maintain some fairness in the admission of the most 
competitive universities in addition to the geographical distribution of ethnic minority population 
could result in the very detailed policy Sichuan has. The other two hypotheses may not be 
reasonable based on the graphs generated. How much the student enrollment rates in regular 
secondary schools and the GDP per capita in regular counties are higher than autonomous 
counties does not seem to affect provincial government’s preferential policy making. Given that 
 Sun   27 
 
the Chinese government’s firm stance on having remedial policies towards ethnic minority 
students is unlikely to change in the near future, these preferential policies will remain for a 
while, but not necessarily without any small adjustment. Therefore, it is crucial to understand 
what may affect provinces’ preferential policy making. Future studies can explore the impact of 
other provincial characteristics on preferential policy making. This paper only focuses on one 
specific aspect of preferential policies – bonus points. Other forms of preferential policies 
towards ethnic minorities mentioned in the introduction section also need to be examined closely. 
Due to the lack of scholarly works on this topic that are support by data, there is a lot of room for 
researchers to narrow the gap between tentative theories and actual circumstances. 
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Source: Nations Online Project (2015) 
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Table 1. Provinces’ Data on Minority Population,  
Bonus Points Percentage and Bonus Points Type/Level 
(N=31 Provinces) 
 
Province 
Ethnic Minority 
Population 
Bonus Points 
Percentage out of 
Total Points 
Bonus Points 
Type/Level 
Count 
Shanxi 0.32% 0.00% 0.5 
Beijing 4.31% 0.67% 1 
Tianjin 2.71% 0.67% 1 
Anhui 0.67% 0.67% 1 
Henan 1.25% 0.67% 1 
Shanghai 0.63% 0.83% 1 
Hebei 4.35% 1.33% 2 
Inner Mongolia 20.83% 1.33% 3.5 
Liaoning 16.06% 1.33% 2.5 
Jilin 9.15% 1.33% 2 
Heilongjiang 4.89% 1.33% 2 
Zhejiang 0.85% 1.33% 1 
Fujian 1.71% 1.33% 1.5 
Shandong 0.70% 1.33% 1 
Hubei 4.36% 1.33% 1 
Guangdong 1.49% 1.33% 1.5 
Chongqing 6.47% 1.33% 2.5 
Xizang(Tibet) 93.93% 2.67% 2 
Shaanxi 0.50% 1.33% 1.5 
Jiangsu 0.35% 2.08% 2 
Hainan 17.38% 2.22% 3.5 
Jiangxi 0.31% 2.67% 2 
Hunan 10.13% 2.67% 3 
Guangxi 38.37% 2.67% 4 
Guizhou 36.56% 2.67% 2 
Yunnan 33.41% 2.67% 6 
Gansu 8.75% 2.67% 1.5 
Qinghai 45.97% 4.67% 5 
Ningxia 34.56% 2.67% 4 
Sichuan 5.00% 6.67% 5.5 
Xinjiang 59.42% 6.67% 4 
 
Source: Chenwu (2014), China Data Center (2000) 
Table 2. Provinces’ Data on Bonus Points Percentage and Student Enrollment  
in Regular Secondary Schools of Regular and Autonomous Counties 
(N=15 Provinces) 
 
Province 
Bonus Points 
Percentage out 
of Total Points 
Number of Counties 
Student Enrollment in Regular Secondary Schools 
(out of 10,000 people) 
Regular 
Counties 
Autonomous 
Counties 
Regular 
Counties 
Autonomous 
Counties 
Numerical 
Difference(△) 
Difference in 
Percentage (△%) 
Hebei 1.33% 132 6 3.520542 3.261609 0.258934 7.35% 
Liaoning 1.33% 36 8 3.073269 2.208274 0.864995 28.15% 
Jilin 1.33% 38 3 3.312769 2.773078 0.539691 16.29% 
Heilongjiang 1.33% 65 1 3.178031 1.510000 1.668031 52.49% 
Zhejiang 1.33% 61 1 4.026878 0.820000 3.206878 79.64% 
Hubei 1.33% 63 2 4.731167 2.379582 2.351584 49.70% 
Hunan 2.67% 81 7 4.761865 1.709365 3.052499 64.10% 
Guangdong 1.33% 74 3 5.80429 0.998078 4.806212 82.80% 
Hainan 2.22% 10 6 3.050794 1.736171 1.314623 43.09% 
Chongqing 1.33% 22 4 4.86783 2.245269 2.622561 53.88% 
Sichuan 6.67% 137 3 3.868035 0.385054 3.482981 90.05% 
Guizhou 2.67% 65 11 2.469349 1.468862 1.000487 40.52% 
Yunnan 2.67% 91 29 2.071385 1.237729 0.833656 40.25% 
Gansu 2.67% 69 7 1.79589 0.645683 1.150207 64.05% 
Qinghai 4.67% 32 7 0.893931 1.709197 -0.81527 -91.20% 
Average: 3.428402 1.67253 1.755871 41.41% 
 
Source: Chenwu(2014), China Data Center (2000) 
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Table 3. Provinces’ Data on Bonus Points Percentage and 
GDP per capita of Regular and Autonomous Counties 
(N=15 Provinces) 
 
Province 
Bonus Points 
Percentage out 
of Total Points 
Number of Counties GDP per capita (dollars) 
Regular 
Counties 
Autonomous 
Counties 
Regular 
Counties 
Autonomous 
Counties 
Numerical 
Difference(△) 
Difference in 
Percentage (△%) 
Hebei 1.33% 132 6 6944.73 4242.17 2702.56 38.92% 
Liaoning 1.33% 36 8 6716.67 4877.79 1838.88 27.38% 
Jilin 1.33% 38 3 5361.23 6524.72 -1163.49 -21.70% 
Heilongjiang 1.33% 65 1 4827.84 3970.71 857.13 17.75% 
Zhejiang 1.33% 61 1 12500.51 4615.38 7885.12 63.08% 
Hubei 1.33% 63 2 5167.34 5306.78 -139.44 -2.70% 
Hunan 2.67% 81 7 4286.73 3145.18 1141.54 26.63% 
Guangdong 1.33% 74 3 7720.34 3645.81 4074.52 52.78% 
Hainan 2.22% 10 6 5684.52 4208.78 1475.74 25.96% 
Chongqing 1.33% 22 4 3687.83 2036.17 1651.67 44.79% 
Sichuan 6.67% 137 3 3893.51 2450.32 1443.19 37.07% 
Guizhou 2.67% 65 11 2400.82 1559.84 840.98 35.03% 
Yunnan 2.67% 91 29 3362.17 2527.51 834.66 24.83% 
Gansu 2.67% 69 7 2458.29 1406.58 1051.72 42.78% 
Qinghai 4.67% 32 7 3891.03 2947.37 943.66 24.25% 
Average: 5260.24 3564.34 1695.90 29.12% 
 
Source: Chenwu(2014), China Data Center (2000) 
 
